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I. INTRODUCTION
AT ONE TIME, airline travel was reserved for the wealthy and
X he businessman.' Today, commercial air travel is a main-
stay of modern society.2 In fact, approximately "1.5 million pas-
sengers board 22,000 flights daily on U.S.-based carriers.' '3 In
one year alone, "[o]ver 450 million passengers board 6.5 million
flights annually at American Airports."4 Yet, for those with the
means and desire to take advantage of the popularity and the
availability of air travel, this ease of access creates an opportunity
for terrorist groups. Airline deregulation and the resulting com-
petition has made it possible for practically anyone to board a
commercial airliner for either a domestic or an international
flight. Therefore, there is ample opportunity for terrorist at-
tacks on both domestic and international travelers.5
Recent terrorist attacks, including Pan Am Flight 103, the
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, have made the threat to American citizens very real. Public
opinion polls reveal that almost sixty percent of Americans sur-
veyed said that they are "very concerned that terrorists will com-
mit acts of violence in the [United States], for instance, and
33% say they are somewhat concerned."6 Even though the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board recently made public its find-
' See Sanford L. Dow, Airport Security, Terrorism, and the Fourth Amendment: A Look
Back and a Step Forward, 58J. AIR L. & CoM. 1149 (1993).
2 See id.
3Jayne Clark, Crash Makes Frequent Flyer Think Twice, PITTSBURGH POST-GA-
ZETrE, July 28, 1996, at Fl.
4 Dow, supra note 1.
5 See id. at 1149-50.
6 Gerald F. Seib, Terrorism Fear Running Deep, U.S. Poll Finds Effect of Oklahoma
Crisis Exceeds Other Attacks; Clinton Rating Rises, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at A4.
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ings that the crash of TWA Flight 800 was the result of
mechanical failure, this has done little to quell these concerns.7
The commercial aviation industry in particular has felt the im-
pact of such attacks. Historically, commercial aircraft have been
targets of terrorism. In 1931, an aircraft in Peru was hijacked,
marking the first recorded incidence of terrorism involving an
airplane.8 The first act of terrorism against an United States air
carrier occurred on November 1, 1955. An United Airlines jet
exploded eleven minutes after takeoff when a dynamite bomb
detonated in a baggage compartment, killing thirty-nine passen-
gers and five crew members.9 Worldwide, between 1949 and
1990, there were ninety-five documented explosions aboard
commercial aircrafts, resulting in over 2100 deaths.10 Further-
more, it is clear that the threat continues today. Recently, an
Ethiopian airliner was hijacked by a group of intoxicated ter-
rorists who refused to allow the aircraft's pilot to land the air-
plane in order to refuel.1" The aircraft eventually ran out of fuel
and crashed into the Indian Ocean, killing 123 people.1 2
In response to this growing threat to American citizens and
the public concern that has increased exponentially, the govern-
ment and the aviation industry have begun to take measures to
prevent further tragedy. These measures, in the form of new
legislation and new regulations, have tightened security and im-
posed new travel restrictions in the aviation industry.13
With the increased security and restrictions placed on travel,
the recognized constitutional right to travel is restricted. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized a right to inter-
7 See United States Department of Transportation, Fact Sheet-FAA Actions on
Aviation Safety and Security Relating to the TWA 800 Accident (Dec. 8, 1997)
(News Release).
8 See Humphrey G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hijacking and International Terrorism:
An Historical and Legal Review, 15 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 57, 58 (1987).
9 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TER-
RORISM, at 160 (1990).
10 See Foreign Airport Security: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st
Cong. 197-98 (1989).
II See 3 Hijackers Drunk as Jet Crash-Lands: Witnesses Tell Terror on Ethiopian Plane,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1996, at 3.
12 See id.
13 See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Signs a Wide-Ranging Measure on Airport Security,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at B3; James Ott, Security Rates "Top Priority:" Terrorism
Threat Drive Administration Plan for Bomb Detectors, Staffing and a Security "Partner-
ship," AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 16, 1996, at 36.
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state and international travel. 4 Furthermore, airlines have a
duty to provide service to those who pay for such services. 5
However, despite recognition of this right to travel, limita-
tions on the right have been upheld. For example, restrictions
may be placed on the right to travel when national security con-
cerns are at issue.' 6 Furthermore, as aviation has become an in-
creasingly "popular" target of terrorists, certain restrictions
aimed at reducing this threat have been upheld as well. 7
While government restrictions on the right to travel are care-
fully scrutinized, self-initiated airline restrictions are not care-
fully policed. As a result, the aviation industry tends to have
unchecked discretion in decisions that restrict an individual's
right to travel.' 8 This Comment contends that the government
and the aviation industry alike must strike a delicate balance be-
tween the constitutional right to travel and the necessity for in-
creased security.
Other measures can be taken to protect air travel that can
achieve all-important objectives: protecting United States citi-
zens, keeping the aviation industry financially viable, and pro-
tecting the right to travel. Terrorism has severely taxed the
resources of the airlines. In order to keep airlines financially
viable, it will be shown that efforts to protect American citizens
must be a partnership between the airline industry and the gov-
ernment. 9 Until recently, the financial burden has been
placed, for the most part, on the airline industry.20 However,
new legislation recently passed calls for more of a partnership
between government and the aviation industry.21 Thus, in order
to both keep the airlines financially viable and protect American
citizens, this "partnership" must be implemented and expanded.
14 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) (recognizing an international
right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969) (recogniz-
ing a right to interstate travel).
15 See 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988) (requiring provision of "safe and adequate
service").
16 See Haig, 453 U.S. at 309 (holding that passport revocation of individuals
threatening and carrying out activities that threatened national security was
appropriate).
17 See 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1994).
18 See Katherine Warner, You Can't Get There From Here: Travel Restrictions and
the Airlines, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 345, 366-67 (1992).
19 See Ott, supra note 13, at 36.
20 See id.
21 See Purdum, supra note 13, at B3.
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Furthermore, new technology becomes available with increas-
ing speed. However, as technology is not the only answer,
human effort must be accorded the proper focus. Therefore,
the bottom line is that until some of the new technology is avail-
able and in place, tightened security must continue with a
watchful eye toward protection of the right to travel.
II. RESPONSE TO INCREASED TERRORIST THREATS
TO AVIATION
Commercial airlines have ushered in an era of unprecedented
movement between the people of our nation and other nations
alike.28 This movement has been accompanied by a dramatic
increase in terrorist attacks on both domestic and international
flights. Most recently, in 1988, 270 died when Pam Am Flight
103 was bombed.24 Government response has been on both an




The transportation industry, and particularly the airline in-
dustry, has historically attracted terrorist attacks. As a result, the
international community has come to terms with the aviation
industry's vulnerability. 25 Therefore, the world has seen the in-
ternational community take measured steps toward the protec-
tion of the industry.26
Piracy was the earliest form of terrorist attack against interna-
tional transportation. 27 At the time, there was an understanding
in the international community that pirates should be captured
and brought to justice in the nation with territorial jurisdiction
in each particular instance.28
22 See David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1996).
23 See Laurie M. McQuade, Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: The American Way?,
11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (1996).
24 See Aphrodite Thevos Tsairis, Lessons of Lockerbie, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. &
COM. 31 (1996).
25 See R.I.R. Abeyratne, Attempts at Ensuring Peace and Security in International
Aviation, 24 TRANSP. LJ. 27, 28 (1996).
26 See id.
27 See id.; see also Gary N. Horlick, The Developing Law of Air Hijacking, 12 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 33, 65 (1971).
28 See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 29.
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The year 1968 has been recognized as "the beginning of the
modern era of international terrorism. "29 The years following
saw an unprecedented increase in hijackings, bombings, and
other terrorist activity.30 Hijacking, or "air piracy," became a se-
rious threat to international air safety.31 The international com-
munity was forced to address this growing problem, and in
doing so, developed a system that would govern "the protection
of passengers traveling beyond their own country's borders. 32
The result has been an ongoing attempt to establish "uniform
rules of international travel. 33
a. The Warsaw Convention
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air was signed in 1929.14
This international treaty's purpose was to protect the airline in-
dustry at a time when injury or loss was thought to be a result of
imperfect airline technology, rather than advanced bomb tech-
nology. 5 Although the Warsaw Convention dealt more with the
economic protection of the aviation industry in the event of an
accident and is outdated in its treatment of innocent passen-
gers, it is the first example of international cooperation in the
airline industry. Later, the international community would have
to deal with the terrorist attacks that were occurring with more
and more frequency.
b. The Hague Protocol
The Hague Protocol modified the Warsaw Convention. 6
Signed in 1955, the main objectives of the Hague Protocol were
to increase the limit of damages that passengers could recover,
29 Shirlyce Manning, The United States' Response to International Air Safety, 61 J.
AR L. & COM. 505, 507 (1996) (citing JEFFERY D. SIMON, THE TERRORIST TRAP:
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM 97 (1994)).
30 See Grant Wardlaw, State Response to International Terrorism: Some Cautionary
Comments, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 206-07 (Rob-
ert 0. Slater & Michael Stohl eds., 1988).
31 See Manning, supra note 29, at 507.
32 McQuade, supra note 23, at 327.
33 Id.
34 Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40105
(1996)) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
35 See N.J. Strantz, From Technology to Teamwork: Aviation Security Reform Since Pan
Am Flight 103, 3 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 235, 240 (1993).
36 See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A
LEGAL HANDBOOK 6 (1988).
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provide for costs of litigation, and make the Warsaw Convention
applicable to agents of commercial air carriers.
c. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas was the first inter-
national attempt to equalize the rules applying to piracy at sea
and in the air.38 As in the earlier days, the Convention placed
responsibility on the various nations to "co-operate" to the ful-
lest extent in the containment of piracy either by prosecution or
extradition. 9 Additionally, the Convention modified its defini-
tion of piracy to include piracy by aircraft for the first time.4 °
d. The Tokyo Convention
The Tokyo Convention was the first substantial effort at deal-
ing with terrorism in the air, and resulted in the first interna-
tional treaty addressing hijacking.4 1 The provisions of the treaty
were primarily concerned with jurisdiction over criminal acts
committed in the air.42
Although the Tokyo Convention did "get the ball rolling," it
has endured harsh criticism. Most of the criticism centers
around the Convention's failure to list any offenses that state
parties are required to suppress or to impose any obligations
involving the prosecution or extradition of offenders.43 In other
words, a Contracting State under the Convention is not re-
quired to punish an offender upon leaving the aircraft. Instead,
the state must set the offender free and let such an individual to
proceed to any destination if the State does not choose to extra-
dite or prosecute.44
37 See id.
38 See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 29.
39 See id. at 30.
40 See HENRY REIFF, THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF THE SEA 86-87
(1959).
41 See The Conventions on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter To-
kyo Convention]; see also Abraham Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Conven-
tion, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1974); Haro F. Van Panhuys, Aircraft Hi-
jacking and International Law, 9 COLUMJ. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1970).
42 SeeJOSEPH J. LAMBERT, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw-A
COMMENTARY ON THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION 1979, at 51 (1990).
43 See id.
44 See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 30.
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As a result, the Tokyo Convention left much to be desired
with regard to the international legal system. None of the con-
tracting nations made any attempt to make aircraft hijacking il-
legal under its laws.4 As a result, many nations had no
provision for harsh punishment of such an offense, much less a
46artathprovision for extradition or prosecution. It was clear that the
international community would have to continue to try to im-
prove on the existing law with regard to terrorist attacks di-
rected at the commercial aviation industry.
e. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention defined the offense of hijacking, or
"unlawful seizure of an aircraft" as
[a]ny person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) [u]nlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form
of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or
attempts to perform any such act, or (b) is an accomplice of a
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act com-
mits an offense.47
Therefore, since the act must be committed by a person on
board an aircraft that is "in flight," this definition excludes of-
fenses committed by individuals not on board the aircraft in
flight. As a result, individuals sabotaging an aircraft but remain-
ing on the ground are not included in this definition. The
Hague Convention, therefore, seems to suffer the same inade-
quacies as the Tokyo Convention. Thus, although the Hague
Convention continued to move toward the goal of clearly defin-
ing and punishing offenses against the commercial aviation in-
dustry, it was clear that significant improvement was still
required.
f. The Montreal Convention
The Montreal Convention, signed into law in 1971, is perhaps
the best effort to contain the growing international terrorism
45 See id. at 42.
46 See id.
47 The Convention for the Multilateral Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133; see also S.Z. Feller,
Comment on "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Aircraft Hijacking," 7 ISRAEL L. REv. 207, 211
(1992); I.D. Johnston, Legislation, 5 NEW ZEALAND L. Rrv. 8, 307 (1973); Sami
Shubber, Aircraft Hijacking Under the Hague Convention 1970-a New Regime, 22
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 687, 725 (1973).
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problem.4 8 It addressed the shortcomings of both the Tokyo
Convention and the Hague Convention. Its objectives are best
described as follows:
The primary aim of the Montreal Convention was to arrive at a
generally acceptable method of dealing with alleged perpetrators
of acts of unlawful interference with aircraft. In general, the na-
tions represented at the Montreal [Convention] agreed that acts
of sabotage, or violence and related offenses interfering with the
safety and development of international civil aviation constituted
a global problem which had to be combated collectively by con-
cerned nations of the international community. A multilateral
international convention had to be adopted which extended
both the scope and efficacy of national legislation and provided
the legal framework for international co-operation in the appre-
hension, prosecution and punishment of alleged offenders.49
The Montreal Convention took significant steps toward remedy-
ing the shortcomings of its predecessors. Notwithstanding this
effort, some problems remained. Thus, it is clear that although
much work has been done with regard to international treaties
defining terrorist acts, there is more to be done.
g. The Bonn Declaration
In 1978, the leaders of the governments of Canada, France,
the federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States signed
the Bonn Declaration.50 The purpose of the declaration was to
give the contracting nations the ability to act against nations
who either refused to punish or even encouraged terrorist acts
against commercial aircraft.
The Bonn Declaration, unlike the prior attempts to control
international terrorism, attempted to add a punitive element di-
rected at nations not complying with extradition or prosecution
48 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 115 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
49 Abraham Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure and Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention, 14 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 268, 278-79 (1975).
50 The Bonn Agreement on Hijacking of 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1985) [herein-
after Bonn Declaration]. See Mark E. Fingerman, Skyjacking and the Bonn Declara-
tion of 1978: Sanctions Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 123,
142 (1980); Hartmut Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and the United State Pressure
Against Chile; Economic & Political Coercion & the Charter of the United Nations, 7
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1974).
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requests. Unfortunately, the agreement was not well-repre-
sented, which presented problems of compliance on the part of
non-contracting nations. A solution might include elements of
the Bonn Declaration and its predecessors, with a greater repre-
sentation of the international community. Until such an agree-
ment is reached, problems will remain with regard to the
punishment of persons committing offenses against the com-
mercial aviation industry.
2. Domestic Response
The United States government is responsible for those treaties
and agreements that govern international travel. In addition, a
"domestic system of controls and regulations for airline safety" is
in place as well.5" Although the Department of Transportation
currently governs the system, responsibility for the safety of
American citizens travelling on commercial airlines has histori-
cally been shared by government and the aviation industry.
Notwithstanding government involvement, much of the finan-
cial burden has been placed on the airlines.
The United States government's response to terrorism, partic-
ularly that directed at the aviation industry, has taken two forms.
First, the government created the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA). The FAA bears much of the responsibility for the
safety of American citizens flying commercial airlines. Second,
legislation has been passed periodically in an attempt to deal
with terrorism aimed at U.S. citizens.
Much of this legislation has immediately followed terrorist at-
tacks aimed at or affecting U.S. citizens. For instance, following
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Congress enacted the Avia-
tion Security Act of 1990.52 The Aviation Security Act was signed
by the President on November 16, 1990, and was designed to
enhance civil aviation by providing increased security from ter-
rorism and other criminal acts against passengers of American
air carriers.53
The FAA, working under the authority of the Department of
Transportation, is the government agency responsible for "pro-
moting safe air travel and enforcing security measures affecting
51 McQuade, supra note 23, at 332.
52 See Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104
Stat. 3066.
5 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 107, 108 (1990).
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aircraft and air terminals." 4 The administrator of the FAA has
the power to carry out those duties and powers of the Secretary
of Transportation that relate to aviation safety."
As international and domestic terrorist attacks have risen
throughout the years, the FAA's focus has turned toward im-
proving security measures on both international and domestic
flights. Procedures have been implemented that require any do-
mestic air carrier flying overseas to first obtain FAA approval.56
In order to obtain such approval, a carrier must implement a
program designed to protect its passengers from "acts of crimi-
nal violence and air piracy. '57 These programs must encompass
procedures including passenger and baggage screening, airport
security, the hiring of law enforcement officers, implementation
of an x-ray screening system, employee training, implementa-
tion of an explosive detection system to be utilized on interna-
tional flights, and implementation of a security program
designed to deal with bomb threats.58 The FAA made the
screening programs mandatory fixtures at American airports be-
ginning in 1973.59
As a result of a finding that the security procedures imple-
mented thus far were inadequate, the FAA established more spe-
cific regulations in 1986 designed to afford greater protection.6 °
The regulations, entitled the Air Carrier Standard Security Pro-
gram, mandate that every carrier, with the approval of the rele-
vant airport, enact heightened security measures at airports
designated "extraordinary security airports.
61
Congress passed various additional acts of legislation with re-
gard to terrorism, usually coming on the heels of a terrorist at-
tack. For example, following the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103, the government took an even closer look at airport security
and airline bomb detection measures. Shortly after the bomb-
ing, a commission was formed to evaluate the government's avia-
54 Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, §§ (i)-(h), 75 Stat. 466 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 472 (i)-(m), (o) (1994)); see also ROBERT BURKHARDT, THE
FEDERAL AVtATION ADMINISTRATION 25 (1967).
55 See 49 U.S.C. § 106(g)(A) (1994).
56 See 14 C.F.R. § 108 (1991).
57 Id. § 108.7(a) (1).
58 See id. §§ 108.18, 129.25(e).
59 See id.
60 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804,
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tion security policies.6 2 Following the report of the President's
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, President
Bush signed the Aviation Security Improvement Act into law.6 3
The 1990 President's Commission Report included recommen-
dations and criticisms of almost every facet of the then-existing
airline security system. The report called for "greater emphasis
on long-term strategic thinking and anticipation of terrorist ac-
tions, rather than mere operational reaction to such events. 64
Furthermore, the report urged that the research and develop-
ment effort should be "more focused and higher profile."65 The
report called for the use of bilateral and multilateral agreements
to "determine and set standards, conduct periodic security as-
sessment, and impose sanctions against foreign airports guilty of
noncompliance."66 Finally, the report called for a "zero toler-
ance" policy towards terrorism.67
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 incorporated
many of the recommendations of the President's Commission.
Since the introduction of the Act, no confirmed terrorist acts of
the magnitude of Pan Am Flight 103 have been directed at an
U.S. aircraft.
Despite the coverage of these programs, it is important to
avoid complacency. Although the Act can certainly be viewed as
a step in the right direction, there are still significant breaches
in security at domestic airports. Furthermore, certain interna-
tional airports are still lacking in the security measures that have
been deemed necessary to the protection of both American and
foreign citizens.68 For example, the airport in Athens, Greece is
considered by many to be one of the most dangerous airports in
the world. In fact, the following years would see an unprece-
dented increase in terrorism, particularly that directed at
United States citizens.
Following a rash of non-aviation terrorist attacks, the Clinton
administration responded with the Omnibus Counter-Terrorism
62 See Strantz, supra note 35, at 243.
63 See Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104
Stat. 3066.
64 136 CONG. REC. 16470-78 (1990) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 16478.
67 Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, supra note 63.




Act of 1995.69 The $2 billion measure was a result of the increas-
ing acts of terrorism directed at American citizens as well as con-
cerns that security measures at airports were inadequate.7v
Although there were not any attacks directed at aircraft, there
seems to be a notion that terrorism is inextricably linked to for-
eign citizens, and that by tightening security with regard to the
aviation industry, particularly domestic security, that this will af-
ford some protection to American citizens. Recent events, such
as the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Atlanta Olympic Park
bombing, and the acts of the Unabomber have perhaps opened
eyes to the very real specter of domestic terrorism.
The legislation contained provisions authorizing the hiring of
1000 new federal law enforcement personnel nationwide, an in-
crease in the federal penalties for terrorist crimes, and even a
provision allowing United States citizens to sue foreign nations
for personal injuries caused by terrorist acts. 7 1
More recently, the Clinton Administration pushed through
an aviation bill that includes a range of new baggage-scanning,
passenger-screening, and counter-terrorism measures as part of
a "program of stepped-up surveillance at airports."72 The bill, a
result of the findings of the Gore Commission, entitled the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act, provides for
fifty-four baggage screeners to detect explosives, 114 new dog
teams to sniff out suspicious baggage, and the use of computer
training and testing to instruct baggage inspectors at the na-
tion's busiest airports.73 The bill further authorizes airlines to
upgrade existing computer systems, giving them the ability to
better profile passengers with data from existing government
lists of suspected terrorists or terrorist traits. 4
The legislation has good intentions; this much is clear. But
this last provision seems almost comical, as one cannot imagine
that this can be a realistic vision. The fight against terrorism
could be viewed as a technology race, and so far terrorist groups
continue to nip at the heels of government change. In other
69 S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995). Interestingly enough, the legislation was pro-
posed right before the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995.
70 See Marcy Gordon, Senate Passes Anti-Terrorism Bill, COURIERJ., June 8, 1995,
at A5.
71 See id.
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words, improved technology on the government's part only en-
courages the same on the part of terrorist groups, and they have
kept up thus far. Therefore, it leads one to wonder whether
such provisions are merely means by which the government is
trying to soothe American citizens' fears, instead of being a
means of attaining a solution.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF TIGHTENED SECURITY ON THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL iS RECOGNIZED
Transportation systems, and commercial airlines in particular,
have traditionally attracted terrorist attacks. The tightening of
security at airports both in the United States and abroad has the
goal of discouraging these attacks, but the security measures
taken both on the international and domestic levels have an-
other effect: they limit a United States citizen's right to travel.
There exists in the United States a citizen's constitutional
right to travel.75 This right may only be limited in certain cir-
cumstances.76 Therefore, it is important to strike a delicate bal-
ance between concerns for the safety of American citizens and
this constitutionally recognized right.
1. Right to International Travel
Passports have long been necessary for international travel.
In United States v. Laub the United States Supreme Court held
that the passport has since early days been recognized as a "doc-
ument identifying a citizen, in effect requesting foreign powers
to allow the bearer to enter and to pass freely and safely, recog-
nizing the right of the bearer to the protection and good offices
of American diplomatic and consular officers."77
Passports, though considered a great convenience for travel,
have not always been required for leaving or entering the
United States. During the War of 1812, a "travel-control" statute
was passed, which required citizens crossing "enemy territory" to
carry a passport.78 Restrictions in essentially the same form were
imposed during the Civil War.79 Although similar legislation
75 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958).
76 See Warner, supra note 18, at 346.
77 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967); see also Kent, 357 U.S. at 120-21; Urtetiqui v.
D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835).




was passed from time to time, regulation of passports was not
solidified until 1952.80 The 1952 legislation mandated that after
a prescribed proclamation by the President, it is "unlawful for
any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or at-
tempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears
a valid United States passport."8 1
There are several instances in which restrictions on interna-
tional travel have been challenged. 82 The line of cases docu-
menting these challenges seems to diverge into two distinct
lines. One challenges restrictions on who may travel, and the
other challenges restrictions on where one may travel.
In Kent v. Dulles plaintiffs application for a passport was de-
nied on the grounds that he was a Communist, that he had "a
consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party
line," and that he refused to sign an affidavit stating whether or
not he was a member of the Communist Party. 3 The case came
to the Supreme Court after the District of Columbia Circuit
Court upheld a State Department regulation that mandated
passport denial to members or supporters of the Communist
Party.8 4
In Kent the United States Supreme Court first discussed the
essential nature of the right to travel, holding that "[t] he right
to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
ment . . . Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values."8" In holding that a passport could not be denied on
ideological grounds and that Kent was thus wrongfully denied a
passport, the Court for the first time identified two situations in
which passport denial would be appropriate. The Court held
that refusal of passports would be appropriate when:
First, questions pertinent to the citizenship of the applicant and
his allegiance to the United States [exist] .... [or] [s]econd,
80 See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 190 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185) (1994)).
81 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1997).
82 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Flynn v. Rusk, 219 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C.
1963) rev'd, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
83 357 U.S. at 118.
84 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-.143 (1991); Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
85 357 U.S. at 125-26.
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[when] the question whether the applicant was participating in
illegal conduct, trying to escape the toils of the law, promoting
passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct which would
violate the laws of the United States [exists].86
As a result, it is clear from the line of cases preceding Kent that
passports may be refused to an individual based on who they are
only in limited situations.
The second line of cases deals with restrictions on where one
may travel. In Zemel v. Rusk the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of "area restrictions."8 7 Until 1961, passports were not
required for travel anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.8 At
that time, the United States broke diplomatic relations with
Cuba, eliminated Cuba from the area for which passports were
not required, and declared all U.S. passports to be invalid for
travel to Cuba unless such travel was under the authority of the
Secretary of State.8 9 An exception was to be granted to any "per-
sons whose travel may be regarded as being in the best interests
of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with pre-
viously established business interests."9 Zemel had a valid pass-
port and applied to the State Department to have the passport
validated for travel to Cuba.91 After his request was continually
denied on grounds that his reasons for traveling to Cuba did not
fall within the limited exceptions discussed above, Zemel
brought suit challenging the restriction. 92 Zemel's complaint al-
leged that, inter alia, two federal statutes, the 1926 Passport Act
and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 mandated that
his request be granted.9
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the suit, the
United States Supreme Court discussed at length the 1926 Pass-
port Act and precedent authorizing the State Department to im-
pose area restrictions.94 The Court then distinguished Kent v.
Dulles, holding:
It must be remembered . . . that the issue involved in Kent was
whether a citizen could be denied a passport because of his polit-
86 Id. at 127.
87 381 U.S. 1 (1965).




92 See id. at 4.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 10-11.
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ical beliefs or associations. In finding that history did not sup-
port the position of the Secretary of State in that case, we
summarized that history 'so far as material here'-that is, so far
as material to passport refusals based on the character of the par-
ticular applicant. In this case, however, the Secretary has refused
to validate appellant's passport not because of any characteristic
peculiar to appellant, but rather because of foreign policy con-
siderations affecting all citizens. 5
The Court further noted that although it held in Kent that the
right to travel was a right that could not be deprived without due
process, "the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due
process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances
be inhibited. 9
6
Haig v. Agee, decided in 1981, is the most recent case in which
a court has considered the right to travel doctrine, and perhaps
represents a third line of cases based not on who you are or
where you are going, but based on what you are going to do.9
In Haig, Agee, an American citizen and a former employee of
the Central Intelligence Agency, publicly proclaimed that he
would begin a campaign to expose Central Intelligence Agency
employees.98 After engaging in actions that resulted in the iden-
tification of alleged undercover agents, Agee's passport was re-
voked based on a regulation authorizing revocation of a
passport where an American citizen's activities "are causing or
are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the
foreign policy of the United States."99 Agee brought suit, and
the district court and a divided court of appeals held that the
regulation exceeded the statutory powers of the Secretary of
State. 100
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' rulings, hold-
ing that "[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.""1 1
The Court, in discussing the history of passport regulation,
found that the broad language of the statutes coupled with the
holdings in Kent v. Dulles and Zemel v. Rusk gave the Secretary of
95 Id. at 13.
96 Id. at 14.
97 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
98 See id.
99 Id.
100 See Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980), affd sub nom., Agee v.
Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
101 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)).
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State the "power to deny a passport for reasons not specified in
the statutes."' 2 The Court distinguished Kent v. Dulles, finding
that "[t] he Kent court had no occasion to consider whether the
Executive had the power to revoke the passport of an individual
whose conduct is damaging the national security and foreign pol-
icy of the United States." ' 3 Therefore, the court stated that
"when there is a substantial likelihood of 'serious damage' to
national security or foreign policy as a result of a passport
holder's activities in foreign countries, the Government may
take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit the spon-
sorship of his travels by the United States."'0 4 The court thus
concluded that while the right to travel does have limitations, it
is an important right that will be disturbed only when issues of
national security and foreign policy are at stake.
2. Right to Interstate Travel
The right to international travel is well established, yet there
are limitations on this right. As a result, the right may be lim-
ited, as seen in the discussion above. However, there are signifi-
cantly fewer limitations to the right to interstate travel that will
withstand constitutional challenge.
The right to interstate travel has long been recognized. 105
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Guest held
that
[t]he constitutional right to travel from one State to another,
and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities
of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has
been firmly established and repeatedly recognized ....
Although the Articles of Confederation provided that 'the peo-
ple of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from
102 Id. 453 U.S. at 290. The Court found that this was particularly so in the
context of foreign policy and national security. See id.
103 Haig, 453 U.S. at 304.
104 Id. at 309. The Court also quoted a previous holding, emphasizing that
"while the Constitution provides against invasions of individual rights, it is not a
suicide pact." Id. at 309-10 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
160 (1963)).
105 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Slaughter-House Cases, 21 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1871);
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1981); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8




any other State,' that right finds no explicit mention in the Con-
stitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In
any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. °6
Although not a right specifically delineated in the United States
Constitution, the right to interstate travel derives from the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution,
having also been attributed to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the 14th Amendment and the Commerce Clause.10 v
A long line of cases has further established the right to inter-
state travel as well. 1' Toomer v. Witsell announced the "peculiar
evil test." 109 In Toomer a South Carolina statute required non-
residents to pay license fees for commercial shrimp fishing that
were 100 times greater than those fees that residents paid.110
The United States Supreme Court held that the statute was inva-
lid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2,
of the United States Constitution. 11' The Court reasoned that
the state failed to show a reasonable relationship between the
alleged danger represented by non-citizens and the severe dis-
crimination suffered by them. 12 In so holding, the Court noted
that the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause "is to
outlaw classifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless
106 Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-58.
107 See State Parochialism, and Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article I, Note, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (1989).
108 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31 (holding that statutory provision denying wel-
fare assistance to residents of state or district who have not resided within their
jurisdiction for at least one year violated the right to interstate travel); Guest, 383
U.S. at 745 (conspiracy to deprive African-Americans of right to travel to and
from state and to use state's interstate commerce facilities and instrumentalities
constituted an offense under statute pertaining to conspiracy against rights of
citizens, since right to travel from one state to another is constitutionally pro-
tected); Edwards, 314 U.S. at 169 (holding that a California law prohibiting indi-
gent people from traveling into the state violated the right to interstate travel);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 36 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause merely forbade state infringement of the rights
of national citizenship); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (holding
that a tax on persons leaving the state by paid transportation violated the right to
interstate travel).
109 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
110 See id. at 395.
111 See id. at 399.
112 See id. at 398.
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there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a pe-
culiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed."'"
One of the more recent in this line of cases, and perhaps that
which best represents the Court's current position on the issue
of the right to interstate travel, is Shapiro v. Thompson.1 4 In Sha-
piro, the states of Connecticut and Pennsylvania and the District
of Columbia denied the applications of several individuals for
assistance under the various welfare assistance programs avail-
able.115 The applications were denied pursuant to state law, on
the ground that the applicants had not lived in the state for a
minimum of one year before their application was filed." 6 The
United States Supreme Court held the statutes unconstitutional.
In affirming the district courts' findings, the Court held that
[t]his Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite
to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length
and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regula-
tions which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.' 17
The Court restated the test still utilized today when it held that
"in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia
appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classifi-
cation which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional."" 8 Thus, it appears that any invasions into the
constitutionally protected right to interstate travel will be care-
fully at strictly scrutinized by the courts.
3. Limitations to the Recognized Right to Travel
As shown above, there are some acceptable limitations on the
constitutional right to travel. In the context of international
travel, it is clear that there are several limitations to the recog-
nized right. First, there are two instances where a passport may
be refused: (i) when questions exist as to the citizenship and
allegiance of the applicant, and (ii) when questions exist as to
whether the applicant was engaging in illegal conduct." 9 Fur-
thermore, limitations on where an individual may travel will be
113 Id.
114 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
115 See id. at 622-23.
116 See id. at 623.
M, Id. at 629.
118 Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
119 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958).
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upheld where such limitations are based on foreign policy
grounds affecting all citizens.12° Finally, the limitation will be
upheld in the context of international travel where there is a
"substantial likelihood of 'serious damage' to national security
or foreign policy as a result of the passport holder's activities in
foreign countries."'1 21
Courts will scrutinize limitations on interstate travel more
closely. There are two "tests" of sorts utilized by the courts. The
"peculiar evil" test mandates that when an important state inter-
est exists, a state statute that assigns certain persons to a class
being discriminated against will be upheld if there is a suffi-
ciently close relationship between the means and the ends ob-
tained.1 22  In the more frequently used test, a state or
jurisdiction must show that such a limitation is "necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest" in order to place lim-
itations on the right to interstate travel. 123 Therefore, since the
right to travel, both domestically and abroad, is a zealously
guarded right, any limitations will be examined carefully.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND
THE AvIATION INDUSTRY
Air travel, once a luxury of which only the wealthy and busi-
ness class could partake, has exploded into practically every seg-
ment of the population today. Virtually anyone can purchase a
commercial airline ticket, board an airplane, and travel to any
number of domestic and international locations. With the in-
creasing popularity of air travel and the fast-paced society in
which we live, access to air travel is essential in modern society.
1. Airlines Have a Duty to Provide Service to Customers
Commercial airlines have a duty that arises from both statu-
tory as well as common law to provide service to all paying cus-
tomers, as well as a duty to protect the safety of their paying
customers. 124 Therefore, as a regulated industry, airlines are
statutorily limited as to the restrictions that may be placed on
120 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13 (1965).
12, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981).
122 See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396-398 (1948).
123 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
124 See Austin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 246 So. 2d 894 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (air-
line employee's refusal to sell ticket to customer she reasonably believed to be
intoxicated was not inappropriate under the circumstances).
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their service in a discriminatory manner. 25 However, for the
purposes of this discussion, the only context in which such limi-
tations are relevant is the regulations that allow airlines to dis-
criminate on security grounds.
2. An Airline's Ability to Restrict Travel
Airlines may restrict travel as a result of security concerns.
The threat of terrorist activity clearly falls within these security
concerns. 126 As incidences of both domestic and international
terrorism have increased exponentially throughout the 20th
century, such restrictions have become necessary. Although air-
line restrictions may not be as extensive as government restric-
tions, their effect is often the same.1 27 Airline restrictions have
the effect of directly affecting the right to travel, as well as indi-
rect effects that are primarily economically based. Therefore,
careful examination is warranted of limitations imposed by the
aviation industry in order to maintain the delicate balance be-
tween the right to travel and the protection of air travelers.
a. Direct Effects of Travel Restrictions
As a heavily regulated industry, commercial airlines answer
primarily to the FAA, the government agency charged with its
supervision. Recent increases in terrorist attacks directed at air-
lines has prompted the FAA to promulgate new regulations
aimed at preventing such acts. 128
However, there are some direct effects of the new regulations
that arguably affect the right to travel. First, airlines now re-
quire passengers to provide photo identification that match the
airline tickets held. 129 Furthermore, stringent security measures
in airports may cause delays that preclude travelers from reach-
ing destinations on time, or in some cases, at all.
125 See 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988) (requiring provision of "safe and adequate
service"); Id. § 1374(c) (prohibiting discrimination against physically disabled
passengers); Id. § 1511 (allowing airlines to deny transportation to passengers
after determing that such passenger poses a potential safety threat).
126 See id. § 1511; see also Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1975) (holding that an airline will not incur liability for denying services to a
known criminal); Austin, 246 So. 2d at 897.
127 See Warner, supra note 18, at 367.
128 See Purdum, supra note 13, at B3.
129 See 14 C.F.R. § 108.13 (1997).
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b. Indirect Effects of Travel Restrictions
The security measures taken by the aviation industry have sev-
eral indirect effects that restrict travel as well. Historically, air-
lines themselves have been burdened with many of the costs
associated with ensuring safe passage for their paying customers.
As security costs rise, ticket prices also rise, as airlines are forced
to shift security costs to customers in order to maintain profit-
ability. 130 Additionally, airlines may close routes into countries
where the risk of danger and the cost of insuring safety, particu-
larly with regard to insurance, outweighs or eliminates profit.131
Finally, since responsibility for implementation of security
measures lies primarily with the airlines, there is a potential for
an abuse of discretion as airlines try to determine which passen-
gers pose safety risks.112 Unlike European air carriers, United
States carriers have historically assumed "all domestic security
costs, including the training and equipment for personnel at air-
port security checkpoints, air cargo, and baggage inspection, air-
port access systems, and secured area protection at airports. 133
These increased costs continue to frustrate reforms and to drain
profit margins in the commercial aviation industry. Clearly, the
aviation industry's limited funding prevents them from battling
more adequately funded terrorist groups.3 4 Therefore, it is im-
portant that all of the factors are considered so that the airlines
remain financially viable, passengers are protected from poten-
tial terrorist attacks, and the right to travel is not limited to an
unacceptable degree.
130 See Warner, supra note 18, at 368.
131 See id.; see also Emma Tucker and Neil Buckley, The Gulf War: Airlines Cancel
or Avoid the Worst Spots, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at 4.
132 See Warner, supra note 18, at 368-69.
133 135 CONG. REc. H5768 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar).
134 Although terrorist groups may seem poor, as they are either unable or un-
willing to raise the traditional armies with which they might achieve their objec-
tives, such groups have funding that enables them to continually wreak havoc in
the air as well as on the ground. It is also important to consider that terrorist
groups do not need extensive funding. A terrorist need only place the bomb on
the plane; it is the security that is so expensive, and this is where terrorist groups
gain a major advantage.
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IV. ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO
BALANCE SECURITY INTERESTS AND THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Following the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, significant legis-
lation was passed in hopes that future tragedies could be
avoided. More recently, changes in airport security followed the
downing of TWA Flight 800. Additionally, international treaties
were revised to reflect changing security needs.
Much of this change focuses on technology. As a result, avail-
able technology limits the extent to which such change can be
implemented. Furthermore, history shows that tragedy is a cata-
lyst for security reform." 5 Therefore, perhaps implementation
of a program of ongoing technology improvements might more
efficiently accomplish change.
Intangible components of the aviation security system remain
unaddressable by endless amounts of legislation and regulation.
Thus far, aviation security concentrated on improving the exter-
nal framework of the security system. 1 36 However, legislation
and regulation cannot address the intangible elements of the
system, such as teamwork, public involvement, and a "game
plan" based on a common vision. 13 One commentator argues
that
[T] he black letter of the law has not stopped a terrorist bombing.
Legislation is an effective means of clarifying our objectives, and
statutes do provide us with a structure within which to operate,
but if our laws are too vague to understand, impossible to imple-
ment, unfair in their application, or unknown to those they gov-
ern, then they are no more than an expensive waste of
wordsmithing .... Like regulated standards, technology is only as
good as the persons who physically implement it at the airport.
Its effectiveness will always depend on the intangible, human
element ... .38
135 Much airline and airport security legislation has followed terrorist acts.
One particularly evident example of this is the legislation that followed the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. See Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104 Stat. 3066 (codified in various sections of 49 U.S.C. app.
and 22 U.S.C.); Airport Technology and Research Act of 1989, H.R. 2365, 101st
Cong.; Aviation Security Act of 1989, H.R. 1659, 101st Cong.
136 See Strantz, supra note 35, at 252; NancyJ. Strantz, Aviation Security and Pan
Am Flight 103: What Have We Learned?, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 413 (1990).
137 See Strantz, supra note 35, at 252-53.
138 Id. at 253-55.
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More recently, the focus of aviation security reform has seemed
to shift more to the intangible elements discussed above. Cur-
rent aviation reform is expanding to a broader sharing of reson-
sibility by everyone involved in aviation security, instead of
placing the burdens on the airline industry. However, there is
much work to be done, and in order to adequately protect the
safety of American citizens, prevent unacceptable infringement
into the constitutionally recognized right to travel, and keep the
airlines financially viable, this "partnership" of sorts must con-
tinue to grow.
A. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
REAUTHORIZATION ACT
On October 9, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
FAA Reauthorization Act (H.R. 3539).139 The Act extends for
two years funding authority for FAA capital programs, and more
importantly, makes statutory changes affecting airports, airlines,
and other industry segments.14 ° The provisions of the legisla-
tion directly impacting security measures are a result of the com-
mission headed by Vice-President Al Gore, which recommended
sweeping changes and increased funding to airport and airline
security. 141
1. The Gore Commission Recommendations
The White House Commission on Aviation and Security,
headed by Vice-President Al Gore, was formed with the intent of
making recommendations with regard to the improvement of
airport and airline security. 14 2 The committee was formed in re-
sponse to the possibility that the downing of TWA Flight 800 was
a result of a terrorist attack, as well as the general feeling that
American airports were not as secure as they should be.' 43
The Commission recommended twenty specific actions to im-
prove near-term security. 1" The pricetag: $429.4 million.'45
The Commission report recommended increased funding to im-
prove the screening of checked and carry-on baggage, provide
139 H.R. 3539, 104th Cong. (1996); see Clinton Signs FAA Bill, Touts Security, Fam-
ily Provisions, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 10, 1996, at 62.
140 See id.
141 See id.
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canine teams, further FAA security research, expand the FAA
workforce, improve vulnerability assessments of U.S. airports,
expand and improve passenger profiling, provide better
screener training, and purchase passenger portals and docu-
ment scanners.146
2. Provisions of the Legislation
On its face, the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1996 simply reauthorizes programs of the FAA.' 47
But the Act does far more than this. An entire section of the
legislation is devoted to aviation security, and is a product of the
Gore Commission Recommendations.148
First, the Act provides funding for a study to determine who
can best bear the responsibilities for the security activities con-
ducted at airports in the United States. 149 The study will ex-
amine where Federal funds can best further security activities,
and determine whether further legislation is needed for any
transfer of responsibility for aviation security. 50
In addition, the legislation mandates that the FAA should cer-
tify those companies providing security screening and promul-
gate uniform standards for such companies. 5 ' The Act further
authorizes another study to determine ways in which weapons
and explosives might better be detected. 5 2 Furthermore, the
legislation contains provisions that mandate baggage match to
passengers and criminal history records checks.' Finally, the
legislation provides for substantial funding for all of this, and
more. 14
Although the above legislation is by no means exhaustive, the
Act appears to react to increased acts of terrorism directed to-
ward American citizens. The United States Senate concluded in
its findings that
146 See id. This list is by no means exhaustive, but provides a sampling of the
sweeping changes recommended by the Gore Commission, and for the most
part, implemented in the FAA Reauthorization Act that was signed into law
recently.










(1) there has been an intensification in the oppression and disre-
gard for human life among nations that are willing to export
terrorism;
(2) there has been an increase in attempts by criminal terrorists
to murder airline passengers through the destruction of civilian
airliners and the deliberate fear and death inflicted through
bombings of buildings and the kidnapping of tourists and Ameri-
cans residing abroad; and
(3) information widely available demonstrates that a significant
portion of international terrorist activity is state-sponsored, - or-
ganized, -condoned, or -directed.155
While the legislation seems to strike a blow to terrorism, one has
to wonder if this is simply another means to soothe fears and
that perhaps the solution lies elsewhere.
B. NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE BECOMING AVAILABLE
New and improved technology that can be used to combat the
threat of terrorist attacks on commercial air craft is becoming
available almost every day. For instance, the InVision CTX 5000
automatically detects small amounts of all classes of explosives,
with a high degree of accuracy, and a low false alarm rate. 156
The new CTX-5000 uses the technology of medical CT scans to
map objects inside luggage from several different angles. It
combines these views to create cross-sectional images, analyzing
them to identify potential explosive materials. 57
"The CTX-5000 is the only detection system to have passed
the FAA's certification test.'1 58 As a result, the United States re-
cently purchased fifty-four of these new machines, which will be
installed in airports around the country. 59 Furthermore, the
government has an option to purchase more at a later date. 60
However, although the new technology that becomes avail-
able at an amazing pace appears helpful in the fight against ter-
rorism, this enthusiasm should be balanced with a more
sobering thought. History shows that terrorist groups have been
able to "keep up" with the government's technology advance-
ment. Therefore, it is important to consider the utility of large
155 Id.
156 See In Vision Receives FAA Contract for Minimum of 54 and Up to 100 In Vision
CTX 5000 SP Explosives Detection Systems, Bus. WiRE, Dec. 26, 1996.
157 See Laura Meckler, Airports-Improved X-Ray Devices Can Detect Explosives,
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expenditures on new technology, when it is highly likely that
such technology will be bypassed by terrorist groups.
C. THE NEED FOR A DOMESTIC FOCUS TO COUNTER-
TERRORISM MEAsuREs
Until recently, the focus of counter-terrorism measures has
been a decidedly international one. One only has to consider
the various international treaties and even the legislation en-
acted in the United States to see that most measures taken to
date focus on international terrorist groups. However, recent
events have shown that "home-grown" terrorism is on the rise. 16'
The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma
City, as well as the alarming rise of anti-government militia
groups are signs that domestic terrorism is on the increase.
Although to date, there have been no incidences of a United
States citizen committing any offense against a commercial air-
line, this is perhaps an area that deserves more scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
Today, airline travel is an essential element of society. There-
fore, it must be a safe means of travel for the approximately 450
million United States citizens who board commercial airlines at
American airports annually. 6 2 However, recent events show
that air travel has failed to provide passengers users with a level
of safety acceptable to the public at large, the government and
the industry.'63 The commercial aviation industry presents too
many opportunities for terrorist attacks. In 1990, thirty-four
"unlawful interference" incidents, or terrorist acts, on commer-
cial airliners occured. 114 Although the death rate decreased that
year, the number of terrorist acts directed at commercial airlin-
ers was alarmingly high, and has only increased in the following
years. One incident in particular has affected American citizens:
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, in which 270 people were
killed. Furthermore, although ruled an accident, the downing
of TWA Flight 800, in which 230 lives were lost, raised concern
of American citizens in particular, to an all-time high.' 65 The
161 See Joseph B. Treaster, The Tools of a Terrorist: Everywhere for Anyone, N.Y.
TiMES, April 20, 1995, at B9.
162 See Dow, supra note 1, at 1149.
163 See Unlawful Incidents Up But Death Rate Down, FLIGHT INT'L, Apr. 3, 1991, at
1.
164 Id.
165 See Mark Fischetti, Defusing Airline Terrorism, TECH. REv., April 1, 1997, at 38.
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threat is taking its toll on American citizens in more ways than
one; polls show that almost two-thirds of the American public do
not feel safe flying. 166 Although some of this fear can be attrib-
uted to the recent downings of commercial aircraft due to
mechanical failure, much of the sentiment can be attributed to
the increase in terrorist activity directed at United States
citizens.
It is clear that steps are being taken to correct these problems,
both domestically and internationally. 167 Historically, the avia-
tion industry itself has borne much of the responsibility for im-
plementing security measures at the direction of the FAA. 16
However, new legislation, and particularly the recently passed
Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act, seems to
be aimed at building the "partnership" between government
and the industry that is necessary.' 69 The legislation illustrates
the need for all of the players in the industry to work together,
financially and otherwise. 170 Such measures will take steps to-
ward alleviating the financial burdens that airlines face and will
provide for a better quality of security. 171
In the wake of the heightened security that currently exists
and will likely continue, a watchful eye must be maintained to-
ward unacceptable infringements on the constitutionally recog-
nized right to travel. Acceptable limitations may be placed on
the interstate and international right to travel.' 72 Furthermore,
airlines may to refuse service to passengers in limited situa-
tions. 173 However, because airlines are not watched as closely by
the courts as the government, a potential for an abuse of discre-
tion exists. Furthermore, the determination as to whether an
individual may remain on a flight is usually left to the airlines,
166 See We Are Too Scared to Fly, Majority of Callers Say, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 30,
1996, at A7.
167 See Fischetti, supra note 165, at 38; see also Purdum, supra note 13, at B3.
-6 See Ott, supra note 13, at 36.
169 See Purdum, supra note 13, at B3.
170 See Ott, supra note 13, at 36.
171 See id.
172 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 618 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 22
(1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
173 See 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1994) (allowing denial of transportation upon an air-
line's determination of a potential safety threat posed by a passenger); see also
Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that an
airline will not incur liability for denying service to a known criminal); Austin v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 246 So. 2d 894, 899 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
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with only loose guidelines to limit their discretion.174 There-
fore, the need for the "partnership" discussed earlier is particu-
larly evident in this context, as a means to implement a
"watchdog mechanism" of sorts.
Furthermore, the economics of the situation must be consid-
ered. The costs of adding the security at airports is easily visible
in the funding approved by Congress. It is the cost of the extra
time spent that is often not considered. One study figured that
each passenger spends thirty minutes longer than before at an
airport. 75 The study estimated that at ten dollars per half hour,
the cost is $5 billion in one year.176 When the numbers of pas-
sengers killed as a result of airline sabotage are considered, the
cost of each saved life is astronomical. 77 Although the added
security may give passengers a sense of safety, one has to wonder
whether it is really worthwhile, since other resources are drained
as a result, and such measures have not always proved successful.
Finally, while much progress has been made, there is still work
to be done. New technology is becoming available at a rapid
pace. 178 However, it is important to remember that technology
is only part of the battle; human effort and other intangibles
including teamwork and public involvement are equally impor-
tant.' 79 In order to maintain and further progress, there must
be a partnership between the government and the aviation in-
dustry with the goal of providing safe air transportation for
American citizens, protecting the constitutionally recognized
right to travel, and keeping the commercial aviation industry
profitable.
'74 SeeWarner, supra note 18, at 366; Strantz, supra note 136, at 413; Humphrey
G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hijacking and International Terrorism: A Historical and
Legal Review, 15 INT'L Bus. L. 57 (1987).
175 See Peter Passell, Economic Scene; In Airline Safety, Too Much Vigilence Can Be a
Bad Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at D2.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1996); see alsoJennifer Fron
Mauer, Bomb-Detection Costs Continue Rise on Heels of FAA Pact, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Dec. 30, 1996, at 1.
179 See Strantz, supra note 35, at 240; Strantz, supra note 136, at 413.
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